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Abstract
In this work, we are interested on the analysis
of competing marketing campaigns between an in-
cumbent who dominates the market and a chal-
lenger who wants to enter the market. We are in-
terested in (a) the simultaneous decision of how
many resources to allocate to their potential cus-
tomers to advertise their products for both mar-
keting campaigns, and (b) the optimal allocation
on the situation in which the incumbent knows the
entrance of the challenger and thus can predict its
response. Applying results from game theory, we
characterize these optimal strategic resource allo-
cations for the voter model of social networks.
1 Introduction
In contrast to mass marketing, which promotes a
product indiscriminately to all potential customers,
direct marketing promotes a product only to cus-
tomers likely to be profitable. Focusing on the lat-
ter, Domingos and Richardson [1, 2] incorporated
the influence of peers on the decision making pro-
cess of potential customers deciding between dif-
ferent products or services promoted by competing
marketing campaigns. This aggregated value of a
customer has been called the network value of a
customer.
If we consider that each customer makes a buy-
ing decision independently of every other customer,
we should only consider his intrinsic value (i.e., the
expected profit from sales to him). However, if we
∗Email: antonia.masucci@inria.fr
†Email: alonso.silva@alcatel-lucent.com To whom corre-
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consider the often strong influence of her friends,
acquaintances, etc., then we should incorporate this
peer influence to his value for the marketing cam-
paigns.
In the present work, our focus is different from
previous works where their interest is to which po-
tential customers to market, while in our work is on
how many resources to allocate to market to poten-
tial customers. Moreover, we are interested on the
scenario when two competing marketing campaigns
need to decide how many resources to allocate to
potential customers to advertise their products ei-
ther simultaneously or where the incumbent can
foresee the arrival of the challenger and commit to
a strategy. The process and dynamics by which
influence is spread is given by the voter model.
1.1 Related Works
The (meta) problem of influence maximization was
first defined by Domingos and Richardson [1, 2],
where they studied a probabilistic setting of this
problem and provided heuristics to compute a
spread maximizing set. Based on the results of
Nemhauser et al. [3], Kempe et al. [4, 5] and Mossel
and Roch [6] proved that for very natural activa-
tion functions, the function of the expected num-
ber of active nodes at termination is a submodular
function and thus can be approximated through a
greedy approach with a (1−1/e−ε)-approximation
algorithm for the spread maximization set problem.
A slightly different model but with similar flavor,
the voter model, was introduced by Clifford and
Sudbury [7] and Holley and Liggett [8]. In that
model of social network, Even-Dar and Shapira [9]
found an exact solution to the spread maximization
1
set problem when all the nodes have the same cost.
Competitive influence in social networks has
been studied in other scenarios. Bharathi et al. [10]
proposed a generalization of the independent cas-
cade model [11] and gave a (1 − 1/e) approxima-
tion algorithm for computing the best response to
an already known opponent’s strategy. Sanjeev and
Kearns [12] studied the case of two players simulta-
neously choosing some nodes to initially seed while
considering two independent functions for the con-
sumers denoted switching function and selection
function. Borodin et al. [13] showed that for a
broad family of competitive influence models it is
NP-hard to achieve an approximation that is bet-
ter than the square root of the optimal solution.
Chasparis and Shamma [14] found optimal adver-
tising policies using dynamic programming on some
particular models of social networks.
Within the general context of competitive con-
tests, there is an extensive literature (see e.g. [15,
16, 17, 18]), however their focus is mainly on the
case when the contest success function is given
by the marketing campaign that put the maxi-
mum resources. In that case, Powell [19] stud-
ied the sequential, non-zero sum game who has a
pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where
the defender always plays the same pure strategy
in any equilibrium, and the attacker’s equilibrium
response is generically unique and entails no mix-
ing. Friedman [20] studied the Nash equilibrium
when the valuations for both marketing campaigns
are the same.
2 Model
Consider two firms: an incumbent (or defender) D
and a challenger (or attacker) A. Consider the set
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of potential customers. The chal-
lenger decides to launch a viral marketing campaign
at time t0 = 0 (we will also refer to the viral mar-
keting campaign as an attack). The budget for the
challenger is given by BA ≥ 0. The incumbent D
decides to allocate a budget BD ≥ 0 at time t0 to
prevent its customers to switch. The players of the
game are the competing marketing campaigns and
the nodes correspond to the potential customers.
The strategy for player i, where i ∈
{D,A}, consists on an allocation vector xi =
(xi,1, xi,2 . . . , xi,n) where xi,j represents the budget
allocated by player i to customer j (e.g., through
promotions or offers). Therefore, the set of strate-
gies is given by the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex
∆i = {(xi,1, . . . , xi,n) :
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n and
n∑
j=1
xi,j = Bi}.
We consider each potential customer as a com-
ponent contest. Let pi,j(xi,j , x−i,j), henceforth the
contest success function (CSF), denote the proba-
bility that player i wins component contest j when
player i allocates xi,j resources and the adversary
player −i allocates x−i,j resources to component
contest j. We assume that the CSF for a player i
is proportional to the share of total advertising ex-
penditure on customer j, i.e.,
pi,j(xi,j , x−i,j) =
{ xi,j
xi,j+x−i,j
if xi,j 6= 0 or xi,j 6= 0,
1
2 if xi,j = x−i,j = 0.
(1)
Both firms may have different valuations for dif-
ferent customers. The intrinsic value for player i of
customer j is given by wi,j where i ∈ {D,A} and
1 ≤ j ≤ N . The intrinsic payoff function for player
i is given by
π(xi,x−i,wi) =
n∑
j=1
wi,jpi,j(xi,j , x−i,j), (2)
where wi = (wi,1, wi,2, . . . , wi,n).
We are interested as well on the network value of
a customer. In the next subsection we will compute
this.
2.1 Network value of a customer
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with self-
loops where V is the set of nodes in the graph
which represent the potential customers of the com-
peting marketing campaigns and E is the set of
edges which represent the influence between indi-
viduals. We denote by |S| the cardinality of the
set S, by the index i to one of the two players
(D or A) and by the index −i to the opponent
of player i. We consider that the graph G has n
nodes, i.e. |V | = n. For a node j ∈ V , we de-
note by N(j) the set of neighbors of j in G, i.e.
N(j) = {j′ ∈ V : {j, j′} ∈ E} and by dj the degree
of node j, i.e. dj = |N(j)|.
2
We consider two labeling functions for a node j ∈
V given by its initial preference between different
players, D or A, denoted by functions f0A and f
0
D
respectively. We denote by f0i (v) = 1 when node
v ∈ V prefers the product promoted by marketing
campaign i. We consider that every customer has
an initial preference between the firms, i.e. f0i =
1− f0−i.
We assume that the initial preference for a cus-
tomer j is proportional to the share of total adver-
tising expenditure on customer j, i.e.,
f0i (j) =
{
1 with probability pi,j(xi, yi)
0 with probability p−i,j(xi, yi)
(3)
where the function pi,j(·, ·) is given by eq. (1).
The evolution of the system will be described
by the voter model. Starting from any arbitrary
initial preference assignment to the vertices of G,
at each time t ≥ 1, each node picks uniformly at
random one of its neighbors and adopts its opin-
ion. In other words, starting from any assignment
f0i : V → {0, 1}, we inductively define
f t+1i (j) =
{
1 with prob.
|{j′∈N(j):fti (j′)=1}|
|N(j)| ,
0 with prob.
|{j′∈N(j):fti (j′)=0}|
|N(j)| .
(4)
For player i and target time τ , the expected pay-
off is given by
E

∑
j∈V
wi,jf
τ
i (j)

 . (5)
We notice that in the voter model, the probabil-
ity that node j adopts the opinion of one its neigh-
bors j′ is precisely 1/|N(j)|. Equivalently, this is
the probability that a random walk of length 1 that
starts at j ends up in j′. Generalizing this obser-
vation by induction on t, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Even-Dar and Shapira [9]). Let
ptj,j′ denote the probability that a random walk of
length t starting at node j stops at node j′. Then
the probability that after t iterations of the voter
model, node j will adopt the opinion that node j′
had at time t = 0 is precisely ptj,j′ .
Let M be the normalized transition matrix of G,
i.e., M(j, j′) = 1/|N(j)| if j′ ∈ N(j). By linearity
of expectation, we have that for player i
E

∑
j∈V
wi,jf
τ
i (j)

 =∑
j∈V
wi,jP[f
τ
i (j) = 1]. (6)
The probability that a random walk of length t
starting at j ends in j′, is given by the (j, j′)-entry
of the matrix M t. Then
P[f ti (j) = 1] =
∑
j′∈V
ptj,j′P[f
0
i (j
′) = 1]
=
∑
j′∈V
M t(j, j′)P[f0i (j
′) = 1],
and therefore,
E

∑
j∈V
wi,jf
t
i (j)

 =∑
j∈V
∑
j′∈V
wi,jM
t(j, j′)P[f0i (j
′) = 1].
(7)
We know that P[f0i (j
′) = 1] = pi,j′(xi,j′ , x−i,j′ ).
Therefore, eq. (7) becomes∑
j∈V
∑
j′∈V
wi,jM
t(j, j′)pi,j′(xi,j′ , x−i,j′ ). (8)
Therefore, the expected payoff for player i is
given by
Fi(xi,x−i,vi) =
n∑
j′=1
vi,j′
xi,j′
xi,j′ + x−i,j′
, (9)
where vi = (vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,n).
vi,j′ =
∑
j∈V
wi,jM
t(j, j′), (10)
corresponds to the network value of customer j′ at
time t. The previous expression is subject to the
constraint xi ∈ ∆i.
3 Results
From the previous section, we are able to compute
the network value of each customer, therefore we
can restrict ourselves to work with these values.
With the next proposition, we are able to determine
the best response function for player i considering
the network value of each customer at a target time
τ given that the strategy of the opponent −i is x−i.
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Proposition 2 (Friedman [20]). The best response
function for player i, given that player −i strategy
is x−i, is:
x∗i,j = −x−i,j +(Bi+B−i)
√
vi,jx−i,j∑n
k=1
√
vi,kx−i,k
. (11)
From the previous proposition, we obtain that
the best response functions for players A and D
are given by
x∗A,j = −xD,j + (BD +BA)
√
vA,jxD,j∑
n
k=1
√
vA,kxD,k
,(12)
x∗D,j = −xA,j + (BA +BD)
√
vD,jxA,j∑
n
k=1
√
vD,kxA,k
.(13)
In the next proposition, we assume that the valu-
ations of one of the players are proportional (bigger
(α > 1), smaller (α < 1) or equal (α = 1)) to the
valuations of the adversary player. In that case, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If vi,j = αv−i,j ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
i ∈ {A,D}, with α > 0, then the Nash equilibrium
of the game is given by
xi,j = Bi
vi,j
Vi
, (14)
where Vi =
∑n
j=1 vi,j.
Proof. The proof for the case α = 1 is given
by Friedman [20]. For that case, from eq. (9),
the objective function for player i is given by
Fi(xi,x−i,v−i). For α > 0, we have that the ob-
jective function,
Fi(xi,x−i,vi) =
∑n
j=1 vi,j
xi,j
xi,j+x−i,j
, (15)
= α
∑n
j=1 v−i,j
xi,j
xi,j+x−i,j
. (16)
= αFi(xi,x−i,vi), (17)
and thus we conclude from the previous case.
The previous result not only gives explicitly the
Nash equilibrium under some constraints, but it
proves that a scaling factor for every contest does
not change the Nash equilibrium strategies of the
players.
An interesting property, that we will exploit in
the following is that if for one of the players all
the contests have the same valuation, then for ev-
ery two equal valuation contests for the adversary
player, the equilibrium allocation for each player in
the two contests are equal.
Proposition 4. Assume that vA,ℓ = v ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤
n. If there exist k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that vD,k =
vD,k′ , then xA,k = xA,k′ and xD,k = xD,k′ .
Proof. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since vA,ℓ = v
∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, from eq. (12) we have
xA,j + xD,j = γ
√
xD,j , (18)
where
γ =
(BA +BD)∑n
k=1
√
xD,k
(19)
does not depend on j.
From the difference between eq. (12) and eq. (13),
xD,j = κ
2vD,jxA,j , (20)
where
κ =
∑n
k=1
√
xD,k∑n
k=1
√
vD,kxA,k
(21)
does not depend on j.
Replacing eq. (20) on eq. (18),
(1 + κ2vD,j)xA,j = γκ
√
vD,jxA,j , (22)
or equivalently,
xA,j =
γ2κ2vD,j
(1 + κ2vD,j)2
. (23)
If there exist k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that vD,k =
vD,k′ ≡ w, then from eq. (23),
xA,k =
γ2κ2w
(1 + κ2w)2
= xA,k′ . (24)
From eq. (20), we also obtain
xD,k = κ
2 γ
2κ2w2
(1 + κ2w)2
= xD,k′ . (25)
In Proposition 3, we proved that a scaling fac-
tor between the valuations of the players does not
change their equilibrium strategies. However, we
will see in the following proposition that this situ-
ation is unusual. Actually, even in the case of two
communities within the social network, where the
valuations for the attacker are the same and the
valuations for the defender are different for each
community, the players have very different strate-
gies than the previously considered.
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Proposition 5. Assume n is even, so there ex-
ists m ∈ N \ {0} such that n = 2m. Assume that
vA,ℓ = v ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, vD,k = αv ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m
and vD,k′ = βv ∀m + 1 ≤ k′ ≤ n, for α, β > 0.
Then the Nash equilibrium is given by
xA,1 = . . . = xA,m = x
∗
A,
xA,m+1 = . . . = xA,n = (BA/m− x∗A),
xD,1 = . . . = xD,m =
BD
m
αx∗A
αx∗A + β(BD/m− x∗A)
,
xD,m+1 = . . . = xD,n =
BD
m
β(BD/m− x∗A)
αx∗A + β(BD/m− x∗A)
.
where x∗A is unique (its expression is not important
and thus it is given in the Appendix).
Proof. From Proposition 4, we have that
xA,1 = xA,2 = . . . = xA,m ≡ x,
xA,m+1 = xA,m+2 = . . . = xA,n ≡ y.
From eq. (20),
xD,j
vD,jxA,j
= κ2, (26)
where κ does not depend on j. Therefore for all
k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xD,k
vD,kxA,k
=
xD,k′
vD,k′xA,k′
. (27)
Let us consider k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and k′ ∈ {m +
1, . . . , n}, then from the previous equation
xD,k =
αx
βy
xD,k′ . (28)
We know that
∑n
j=1 xD,j = BD, thus
m
(
αx
βy
+ 1
)
xD,k′ = BD. (29)
Then
xD,m+1 = xD,m+2 = . . . = xD,n =
BD
m
βy
αx+ βy
,
(30)
and from eq. (28),
xD,1 = xD,2 = . . . = xD,m =
BD
m
αx
αx + βy
. (31)
Replacing eq. (30) and eq. (31) in eq. (12),
x = −BD
m
αx
αx+ βy
+
BA +BD
m
√
αx√
αx+
√
βy
. (32)
We know that
∑n
j=1 xA,j = BA, thus
m(x+ y) = BA. (33)
From eq. (32) and eq. (33), we obtain
x = −BDm αx(α−β)x+βBA/m (34)
+BA+BDm
√
αx√
αx+
√
β(BA/m−x)
, (35)
which corresponds to x∗A given in the Appendix.
4 Stackelberg leadership
model
For the case when there is an incumbent hold-
ing the market and there is a challenger entering
the market, we consider the Stackelberg leader-
ship model. The Stackelberg leadership model is
a strategic game in which the leader firm moves
first and then the follower firm moves afterwards.
To solve the Stackelberg model we need to find the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for each
player sequentially. In our case, the defender is the
leader who dominates the market and the attacker
is the follower who wants to enter the market.
From Proposition 2, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the attacker is given by eq. (12).
Given this information, the leader solves its own
SPNE.
The Lagrangian for the incumbent is given by
L(xD) =
n∑
k=1
vD,k
xD,k
xA,k + xD,k
−µ
( n∑
ℓ=1
xD,ℓ−BD
)
,
(36)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier. Since the de-
fender already knows the optimal allocation of re-
sources for the challenger, it incorporates this in-
formation into its Lagrangian,
L(xD) =
n∑
k=1
vD,k√
vA,kxD,k
xD,k
BA +BD
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vA,ℓxD,ℓ
− µ
( n∑
ℓ=1
xD,ℓ −BD
)
,
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or equivalently,
L(xD) = 1
BA +BD
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vA,ℓxD,ℓ
n∑
k=1
vD,k
√
xD,k√
vA,k
− µ
( n∑
ℓ=1
xD,ℓ −BD
)
,
The necessary conditions for optimality are given
by the equations
∂L(xD)
∂xD,k
=
1
BA +BD
( √vA,k
2
√
xD,k
)( n∑
ℓ=1
vD,ℓ
√
xD,ℓ√
vA,ℓ
)
+
1
BA +BD
( vD,k√
vA,k
1
2
√
xD,k
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vA,ℓxD,ℓ
)
− µ = 0.
Reordering terms,
2µ(BA +BD) = (37)
√
vA,k√
xD,k
( n∑
ℓ=1
vD,ℓ
√
xD,ℓ√
vA,ℓ
)
+
vD,k√
vA,k
1√
xD,k
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vA,ℓxD,ℓ.
We will use this equation to compute the following
cases.
Proposition 6. If vi,j = αv−i,j ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
i ∈ {A,D}, with α > 0, then the Stackelberg equi-
librium of the game is
xi,j = Bi
vi,j
Vi
, (38)
where Vi =
∑n
k=j vi,j .
Proof. Following the proof of Proposition 4, when
the valuations of the defender are proportional to
the valuations of the attacker, the objective func-
tion for player i is given by Fi(xi,x−i,v−i) =
αFi(xi,x−i,v−i). Therefore, player i has an objec-
tive function equivalent to Fi(xi,x−i,v−i). In that
case, the game is equivalent to a two-player zero-
sum game and thus there is no difference between
the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Nash equilib-
rium given by Proposition 4.
Contrary to the previous proposition, in the sce-
nario considered in Proposition 5, the strategies
of the Stackelberg equilibrium are very different
from the strategies of the Nash equilibrium given
by Proposition 5 and different than the strategies
previously considered.
Proposition 7. Assume that n is even, so there
exists m ∈ N \ {0} such that n = 2m. Assume that
vA,ℓ = v ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, vD,k = αv ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m and
vD,k′ = βv ∀m + 1 ≤ k′ ≤ n, for α, β > 0. Then
the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by
xD,k =
BD
4m
(
2±
√
2(β − α)√
α2 + β2
)
∀1 ≤ k ≤ m,
xD,k′ =
BD
4m
(
2±
√
2(α− β)√
α2 + β2
)
∀m+ 1 ≤ k′ ≤ n.
Proof. From eq. (37), for 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
2µ(BA +BD) =
√
v√
xD,k
α
m∑
ℓ=1
√
vxD,ℓ+ (39)
√
v√
xD,k
β
n∑
ℓ=m+1
√
vxD,ℓ +
√
v√
xD,k
(
α
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vxD,ℓ
)
.
Equivalently,
√
xD,k =
v
2µ(BA +BD)
(
2α
m∑
ℓ=1
√
xD,ℓ + (α + β)
n∑
ℓ=m+1
√
xD,ℓ
)
.
We have the previous expression for every k ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, therefore xD,1 = xD,2 = . . . = xD,m ≡
x.
Similarly, from eq. (37), for m+ 1 ≤ k′ ≤ n,
2µ(BA +BD) =
√
v√
xD,k′
(
α
m∑
ℓ=1
√
vxD,ℓ + β
n∑
ℓ=m+1
√
vxD,ℓ
)
+
√
v√
xD,k′
(
β
n∑
ℓ=1
√
vxD,ℓ
)
(40)
Equivalently,
√
xD,k =
v
2µ(BA +BD)
(
(α+ β)
m∑
ℓ=1
√
xD,ℓ + 2β
n∑
ℓ=m+1
√
xD,ℓ
)
.
We have the previous expression for every k ∈
{m+1, . . . , n}, therefore xD,m+1 = xD,m+2 = . . . =
xD,n ≡ y.
From the difference between eq. (40) and eq. (39),(
α+ β√
y
− 2α√
x
)
m
√
x =
(
α+ β√
x
− 2β√
y
)
m
√
y.
(41)
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The solutions of the previous equation are given by
x =
BD
4m
(
2±
√
2(α− β)√
α2 + β2
)
. (42)
Since x+ y = BD/m, then
y =
BD
4m
(
2∓
√
2(α− β)√
α2 + β2
)
. (43)
From eq. (12), we obtain xA,k for both 1 ≤ k ≤ m
and xA,k′ for m+ 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
5 Simulations
In this section, we compare through numerical sim-
ulations the Nash equilibrium and the Stackel-
berg equilibrium for the allocation game described
above.
Consider that the number of potential cus-
tomers n = 100, 000 and that within these poten-
tial customers we have two communities of equal
size m = 50, 000. We consider that the budget al-
located to capture the market by the attacker is
BA = 200, 000, and we consider three different sce-
narios for the budget of the defender: i) the de-
fender has half the budget of the attacker BD =
BA/2 = 100, 000, ii) the defender and the attacker
have the same budget BD = BA = 200, 000, iii)
the defender has two times the budget of the at-
tacker BD = 2BA = 400, 000.
Assume that the network value of each customer
for the challenger (attacker) is the same vA,ℓ =
v = 10 ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n. However, for the incum-
bent (challenger), each community has a different
network value vD,C1 = v(1 − δ) = 10(1 − δ) for
the customers of the first community and vD,C2 =
v(1+δ) = 10(1+δ) for the customers of the second
community, where δ is a given parameter.
The Nash equilibrium (NE) was computed
through Proposition 5 and the Stackelberg equi-
librium (SE) was computed through Proposition 7.
The percentage increase in profits was computed
as 100 ∗ (SE −NE)/NE. The results are given in
Figure 1 and Figure 2.
In Figure 1, we observe that for small difference
of valuations Stackelberg and Nash equilibria give
roughly the same profit. However, when the differ-
ence of valuations increases we have that while the
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Figure 1: Profits for the incumbent (defender) vs
the difference of valuations between communities
(δ) for equal budgets.
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Figure 2: Percentage increase in profits for the
incumbent (defender) vs the difference of valua-
tions between communities (δ) by committing to
the Stackelberg leadership model versus Nash equi-
librium.
profit obtained by Stackelberg increases, the profit
of the Nash equilibrium after a threshold decreases.
In Figure 2, we notice that for a small difference
of valuations between communities, both models
give roughly the same profits, however when the dif-
ference of valuations between communities grows,
the Stackelberg equilibrium gives much higher prof-
its than the Nash equilibrium.
Another interesting observations is that in the
case when the defender has smaller budget com-
pared with the attacker, the difference in profits
7
from both equilibria is much higher compared with
the scenario when the defender has higher budget.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the case of two marketing cam-
paigns competing to maximize their profit from the
network value of the potential customers. We have
analyzed the following situations: (a) when the de-
cision of how many resources to allocate to mar-
ket to potential customers is made simultaneously,
and (b) when the decision is sequential and the in-
cumbent foreseeing the arrival of the challenger can
commit to a strategy before its arrival.
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Appendix
The term x∗A was computed through Matlab Symbolic Toolbox from the equation:
x = −BD
m
αx
(α − β)x+ βBA/m +
BA +BD
m
√
αx√
αx +
√
β(BA/m− x)
,
and it is given by
x∗A = (((3
(1/2)((B2Dα
8β2(4B4Aα
4 + 8B4Aα
2β2 + 4B4Aβ
4 + 4B3ABDα
4 − 8B3ABDα3β + 72B3ABDα2β2 − 8B3ABDαβ3
+ 4B3ABDβ
4 −B2AB2Dα4 − 24B2AB2Dα3β + 146B2AB2Dα2β2 − 24B2AB2Dαβ3 −B2AB2Dβ4 − 16BAB3Dα3β + 96BAB3D
α2β2 − 16BAB3Dαβ3 + 4B4Dα3β + 8B4Dα2β2 + 4B4Dαβ3))/(m6(α2 − β2)4))(1/2))/18− (α3(2BAβ2 −BAα2 + 3BAαβ
+ 4BDαβ)
3)/(27m3(α+ β)3(α− β)3) + (α3β(2BAβ2 −BAα2 + 3BAαβ + 4BDαβ)(3B2Aαβ − 2B2Aα2 +B2Aβ2
− 2BABDα2 + 6BABDαβ +B2Dα2 +B2Dαβ))/(6m3(α+ β)2(α− β)3)
+ (BAα
4β2(BA +BD)
2)/(2m3(α+ β)(α− β)2))(1/3) − (α(2BAβ2 −BAα2 + 3BAαβ + 4BDαβ))/(3m(α2 − β2))
+ (α2(B2Aα
4 + 2B2Aα
2β2 +B2Aβ
4 − 2BABDα3β + 12BABDα2β2 − 2BABDαβ3 − 3B2Dα3β + 10B2Dα2β2
− 3B2Dαβ3))/(9m2(α2 − β2)2((3(1/2)((B2Dα8β2(4B4Aα4 + 4B4Aβ4 + 4B3ABDα4 + 4B3ABDβ4 + 4B4Dαβ3 + 4B4Dα3β
−B2AB2Dα4 −B2AB2Dβ4 + 8B4Aα2β2 + 8B4Dα2β2 + 146B2AB2Dα2β2 − 16BAB3Dαβ3 − 16BAB3Dα3β − 8B3ABDαβ3
− 8B3ABDα3β + 96BAB3Dα2β2 − 24B2AB2Dαβ3 − 24B2AB2Dα3β + 72B3ABDα2β2))/(m6(α2 − β2)4))(1/2))/18
− (α3(2BAβ2 −BAα2 + 3BAαβ + 4BDαβ)3)/(27m3(α+ β)3(α− β)3)
+ (α3β(2BAβ
2 −BAα2 + 3BAαβ + 4BDαβ)(B2Aβ2 − 2B2Aα2 +B2Dα2 − 2BABDα2+
3B2Aαβ +B
2
Dαβ + 6BABDαβ))/(6m
3(α+ β)2(α− β)3) + (BAα4β2(BA +BD)2)/(2m3(α + β)(α− β)2))(1/3)))/α.
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